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THE TERMINATOR AS ERASER: HOW ARNOLD 
SCHWARZENEGGER USED THE RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY TO TERMINATE NON-DEFAMATORY 
POLITICAL SPEECH* 
David S. Welkowitz** and Tyler T. Ochoa*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While it is no longer unusual for a politician to have been 
a recent celebrity in the commercial world of entertainment, 1 
the Schwarzenegger bobblehead case is one of the rare cases 
in which a politician has filed a lawsuit asserting a right of 
publicity claim.2 However, the Schwarzenegger case and its 
• Copyright © 2005 by David S. Welkowitz and Tyler T. Ochoa. At the authors' 
request, parallel citations to the state reporters, when available, have been in­
cluded . 
•• Professor, Center for Intellectual Property Law, Whittier Law School. A.B. 
1975, Princeton University; J.D. 1978, New York University . 
••• Professor and Academic Director, High Technology Law Institute, Santa 
Clara University School of Law. A.B. 1983; J.D. 1987, Stanford University. 
1. California seems to have been on the cutting edge here, with Ronald 
Reagan (Governor, President), George Murphy (Senator), Sonny Bono (U.S. 
Representative), and Clint Eastwood (Mayor), among others. An example of the 
opposite move-from politician to actor (actually, from lawyer to actor to politi­
cian and back to actor)-is former Tennessee Senator Fred Dalton Thompson, 
currently playing the role of District Attorney Arthur Branch on NBC's televi­
sion series Law and Order. 
2. The most prominent, albeit indirect, example was when the New York 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, asserting then-Mayor Rudy Giuliani's 
right of publicity, denied New York Magazine the right to advertise on city 
buses using the slogan "Possibly the only good thing in New York Rudy hasn't 
taken credit for." New York Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 
125 (2d Cir. 1998). Recognizing that "protecting the right to express skeptical 
attitudes toward the government ranks among the First Amendment's most im­
portant functions," id. at 131, the Second Circuit ruled that the MTA's action 
was an impermissible prior restraint, id. at 131-32. 
Conversely, there have been some recent cases in which political candi­
dates have been sued by companies who claimed that the candidates' adver­
tisements infringed their trademarks. See, e.g., MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v. Nader 
2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) available at 
651 
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settlement exposed some basic flaws in the analysis of celeb­
rity rights problems, flaws that are not unique to its 
political context. Two of those flaws converged in this case 
and are the main subjects of this article.  First, rights of pub­
licity claims frequently are used as a "stealth" alternative to 
defamation claims, in order to circumvent the constitutional 
limitations on defamation claims. Second, the analysis 
promulgated by the California Supreme Court in Com edy III 
Produ ction s, In c. v. Ga ry Saderup, In c.3 and its progeny,4 
though recognizing some of the First Amendment problems 
posed by these cases, has serious faults that undermine its 
assertedly protective sphere. Both of these problems lead to 
the suppression of free speech and were at the root of the set­
tlement in the Schwarzenegger bobble head case. 
II. USING RIGHTS OF PuBLICITY IN LIEU OF DEFAMATION 
Ever since the landmark case of New York Tim es Co. v. 
Sullivan,5 it has been understood that the First Amendment 
creates a substantial hurdle for politicians and other public 
figures seeking to sue those who criticize and disparage 
them.6 A public figure suing for defamation must show that 
the criticism was false and defamatory and that it was made 
with "actual malice"-that is, there must be clear and con­
vincing evidence that the false statements were made with 
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their 
truth or falsity. 7 Since New York Tim es, public figures have 
sought ways to avoid these strict requirements for a success-
2004 WL 434404 (parody of MasterCard's "Priceless" campaign); American 
Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (parody of 
the AFLAC duck). In both cases, the candidates prevailed. 
3. 25 Cal. 4th 387, 21 P.3d 797, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126 (2001). 
4. See Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal. 4th 881, 69 P.3d 473, 134 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 634 (2003), discussed intra at notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
6. Technically, New York Times only involved a public official. The Court 
extended the holding to other public figures in Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 
U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring ), id at 170 (opinion of Black, J., 
joined by Douglas, J., concurring in Parts I and II of Warren's opinion); id at 
172 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by White, J., concurring in Parts I and II of 
Warren's opinion). 
7. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (holding that actual malice is re­
quired); id. at 285-86 (stating that the evidence "lacks the convincing clarity 
which the constitutional standard demands"). 
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ful defamation suit. In Hustler Maga zin e, In c. v. Falwel1,8 for 
example, the Rev. Jerry Falwell sued Hustler for both defa­
mation and intentional infliction of emotional distress for 
publishing a parody advertisement lampooning him.9 The 
jury held for Hustler on the defamation claim,lO but it 
awarded Falwell $200,000 in compensatory and punitive 
damages on the emotional distress claim.l1 The Supreme 
Court prevented this "end run" by holding that the adver­
tisement must be judged by the standard set forth in New 
York Tim es; thus, changing the nomenclature from defama­
tion to intentional infliction of emotional distress did not 
change the constitutional test. 12 As the Schwarzenegger bob­
blehead case and other recent cases have shown, however, 
public figures often turn to rights of publicity to avoid the 
New York Tim es standard. Although such suits are not al­
ways successful, courts are often more sympathetic to right of 
publicity claims than to defamation claims. 
The complaint in the Schwarzenegger bobblehead case 
did not contain any allegations of defamation,13 and, on its 
face, it did not look like a defamation claim. The complaint al­
leged that the defendants' unauthorized manufacture and 
sale of a bobblehead doll featuring Governor Schwarzeneg­
ger's likeness was a violation of his right of publicity,14 action­
able under California's statutory and common-law causes of 
action for misappropriation of a person's identity for commer-
8. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
9. Id. The advertisement was a take-off on advertisements for Campari 
liqueur, which featured celebrities reminiscing about their "first time"-a dou­
ble entendre meant to suggest sex, but which actually referred to their first 
time drinking the liqueur. !d. at 48. In Falwell, the parody advertisement de­
picted Falwell's "first time" as "a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his 
mother in an outhouse." Id. 
10. The jury specifically found that the advertisement could not "reasonably 
be understood as describing actual facts about [respondent] or actual events in 
which [he] participated." Id at 49. 
11. Id. 
12. See id. at 56 (applying New York Times test); David S. Welkowitz, 
Trademark Parody after Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 11 COMM. & THE L. 65 
(Dec. 1989). 
13. See Complaint, Oak Prods., Inc. v. Ohio Disc. Merch., Inc., No. 
SC081563 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. filed Apr. 30, 2004). 
14. See id. '11'11 7-21. The complaint also asserted a claim for unfair compe­
tition. Id '11'11 22-25. See The Schwarzenegger Bobblehead Case: Introduction 
and Statement ofF acts, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 552-53 & n.46 (2005). 
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cial purposes.l5 But the settlement of the case revealed the 
true nature of the claim. The doll in question featured 
Schwarzenegger clothed in a business suit (befitting a public 
official), carrying an assault rifle with a bandolier around his 
shoulder. 16 The settlement permitted the defendants to make 
and sell a bobblehead doll of Schwarzenegger, but without the 
assault rifle and bandolier.17 Belying the complaint's allega­
tion that Schwarzenegger does not allow merchandising of his 
likeness except in connection with his movies, 18 the settle­
ment demonstrates that what Schwarzenegger objected to 
was not really the use of his image; it was the use of his im­
age in a pa rticula r way that was the problem. Governor 
Schwarzenegger was offended (or at least politically con­
cerned) about being portrayed as a real-life lover of military­
style weapons (in the manner of several of his action-movie 
characters, such as the Terminator). Whether this was de­
famatory is beside the point; the focal point of the lawsuit was 
an u nflattering portrait of a public official. This is precisely 
the type of criticism that the New York Times rule was de­
signed to protect. Had a newspaper published a caricature of 
Schwarzenegger in a business suit with an assault rifle, it is 
clear that the caricature would have been protected by the 
First Amendment under the New York Times standard. 19 But 
because the same caricature was sold in three-dimensional 
form, Schwarzenegger was able to use the right of publicity to 
censor criticism of his political persona.20 
15. See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 416-17, 198 Cal. 
Rptr. 342, 346-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing common-law cause of action 
for appropriation of plaintiffs name or likeness, in addition to statutory rem­
edy); CAL. CIY. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2005) ("Any person who knowingly uses 
another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or 
in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or 
soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such 
person's prior consent, . .. shall be liable for any damages sustained by the per­
son or persons injured as a result thereof."). 
16. See Introduction and Statement of Facts, supra note 14, at 551 & Ap­
pendix A. The plaintiffs complaint did not describe or depict the doll; only the 
defendant's "cross complaint" describes the doll's appearance. See Cross­
Complaint for Declaratory Relief <JI 5, Oak Prods., Inc. v. Ohio Discount Mer­
chandise, Inc., No. SC081563 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. filed May 27, 2004). 
17. See Introduction and Statement of Facts, supra note 14, at 554. 
18. !d. at 549 & n.16. 
19. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 53-55 (discussing the important role played by 
caricature and political cartoons in public and political debate). 
20. Ironically, it was only the presence of the assault rifle and bandolier 
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Some of these "stealth defamation" right of publicity 
claims are not so stealthy. In Eastwood v. Superior Cou rt, 21 
for example, Clint Eastwood sued the National Enquirer for 
both false-light invasion of privacy and violation of the right 
of publicity over an allegedly false story about his love life.22 
While the false-light claim included allegations of knowledge 
or reckless disregard of falsity sufficient to satisfy the New 
York Times standard, the right of publicity claim did not.23 
The court blocked this transparent attempt to recover dam­
ages for reputational harm without having to prove "actual 
malice" by holding that a "deliberate fictionalization" violates 
the right of publicity only "when it is presented to the reader 
as if true with the requisite scienter. ,,24 The requisite scienter 
is the same as actual malice: "that the article was published 
with knowledge or in reckless disregard of its falsity.,,25 
Another fairly transparent attempt to use the right of 
publicity as a substitute for a defamation claim is Win ter v. 
DC Comics,26 in which rock musicians Johnny and Edgar 
Winter claimed that defendant's "Jonah Hex" comic book 
misappropriated their likenesses when it depicted them as 
grotesque half-worm, half-human creatures. The complaint 
alleged that the comic book "falsely portrayed [the Winters] 
as 'vile, depraved, stupid, cowardly, sub-human individuals 
who engage in wanton acts of violence, murder and bestiality 
for pleasure and who should be killed,,,,27 and it included 
claims for defamation and invasion of privacy. 28 The Califor-
that gave the defendants a fighting chance of winning the case, because those 
were the elements that arguably made the doll "transformative" under the Sad­
erup standard. See infTa notes 77-93 and accompanying text. Without the as­
sault rifle and bandolier, the doll almost certainly would have been enjoined 
under the Saderup standard, because it would have been only a "literal depic­
tion or imitation of a celebrity." See in fTa note 93 and accompanying text. 
21. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342. 
22. Id. at 413-14, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45. 
23. Id. at 415, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 345. The U.S. Supreme Court had previ­
ously held that claims for false-light invasion of privacy must also meet the New 
York Times "actual malice" standard. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 
(1967). 
24. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 426, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 352. 
25. Id. Because Eastwood did not allege the requisite scienter in the right 
of publicity claim, it was dismissed with leave to replead. Id. 
26. 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), rev'd, 30 Cal. 4th 881, 69 
P.3d 473, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 634 (2003). 
27. 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435. 
28. Id. 
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nia Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of the defamation 
and privacy claims on the ground that "no reasonable reader 
would believe any portion of the depiction arguably relating 
to appellants as factual,,,29 but it reversed the dismissal of the 
right of publicity claim.30 The California Supreme Court re­
versed, recognizing that "the right of publicity cannot, consis­
tent with the First Amendment, be a right to control the ce­
lebrity's image by censoring disagreeable portrayals. ,,31 
But even when it is fairly obvious that the right of public­
ity is being used as an alternative to defamation, many courts 
have permitted such claims to go forward. The facts of Doe v. 
TCl Cablevision,32 for example, are almost identical to those 
in Winter. In Doe, Tony Twist, a former professional hockey 
player known for being an "enforcer," sued Todd McFarlane, 
creator of the comic book series Spa wn, for including in his 
comic book a fictional Mafia don named Antonio "Tony Twist" 
Twistelli.33 McFarlane stated publicly that many of his char­
acters, including Tony Twist, were named after professional 
hockey players.34 AE in Winter, the complaint included a 
defamation claim.35 In an effort to ward off the defamation 
claim, the defendant argued that no reasonable person would 
view the comic book as an assertion (factual or otherwise) 
about the real Tony Twist.36 That argument came back to 
haunt McFarlane when the Missouri Supreme Court reversed 
the trial court's grant of McFarlane's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and ordered a new trial: 
[T]here is .. . an expressive component in the use of 
[Twist's] name and identity as a metaphorical reference to 
tough-guy "enforcers." And yet, respondents agree (per-
29. Id. at 438. 
30. Id. at 442-43. 
31. 30 Cal. 4th at 889, 69 P.3d at 478, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640 (quoting 
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 403, 21 P.3d 
797, 807, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126, 139 (2001». 
32. 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003). 
33. Id. at 366. The Missouri Supreme Court incorrectly stated that the first 
name of the character was "Anthony" (Tony Twist's actual first name) rather 
than "Antonio." 
34. Id. at 366-67. 
35. Id. at 365. 
36. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 2002 WL 1610972 (Mo. App. 2002), at *3, 
rev'd on other grounds, 110 S.W.3d 363, 367 (Mo. 2003) ("McFarlane denied that 
the comic book character was 'about' the real-life Tony Twist despite the fact 
that the names were the same."). 
HeinOnline -- 45 Santa Clara L. Rev. 657 2004-2005
2005 PUBLICITY AND FREE SPEECH 
haps to avoid a defamation claim) that the use was not a 
parody or other expressive comment or a fictionalized ac­
count of the real Twist. As such, the metaphorical refer­
ence to Twist, though a literary device, has very little lit­
erary value compared to its commercial value .. .. 
[U]nder these circumstances, free speech must give way to 
the right of publicity. 37 
657 
On retrial the jury awarded Twist $15 million,3s an 
amount far in excess of any lost commercial value in the Tony 
Twist name.39 That the real purpose of Twist's suit was to re­
cover for his loss of dignity and reputational harm is demon­
strated by his attorney's statement after the retrial: "They 
made Tony into a Mafia boss. He was involved in murders 
and kidnappings and rapes.,,40 McFarlane might have been 
better off risking the defamation claim, with its well­
developed constitutional protections, than being stuck with a 
right of publicity claim, where the defenses are far more lim­
·t d 41 1 e . 
37. 110 S.W.3d at 374. This reasoning places the defendant in a combined 
defamation and right of publicity suit in a no-win situation: if the use is viewed 
as an assertion of fact, the defamation claim may survive summary judgment; 
but if the use is not viewed as an assertion at all, the defendant loses his First 
Amendment defense to the right of publicity claim. 
38. See Peter Shinkle, Tony Twist �ns $15 Million Verdict, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, July 10, 2004, at 13, available at 2004 WL 84634558. The 
original jury verdict had been for $24.5 million. 110 S.W.3d at 365. 
39. Indeed, the trial judge had ruled that when McFarlane first used the 
name, Tony Twist "had no market recognition and 'was earning precisely zero 
income from endorsements.'" Kevin Strickland, You Can Call Me Lex, PICKENS 
COUNTY HERALD, July 21, 2004, available at 
http://theherald.pickens.neUsportsiside072104.htm (last visited Mar. 17,2004). 
In the words of one commentator: 
[d. 
McFarlane creates a fictional comic book character who shares a name 
with a nobody from St. Louis. . . .  A few years later, Mr. Nobody be­
comes a low-watt star, barely known in his own town and completely 
invisible to most of the nation. The character created by McFarlane is 
part of an empire that reaches worldwide. For every one person who 
has heard of Tony Twist the hockey player, there are a thousand who 
know Tony Twist the Spawn villain. And the courts give millions to the 
hockey guy? McFarlane should sue the hockey player for degrading the 
worth of his character by being such a complete whiner. 
40. See Shinkle, supra note 38. 
41. If the defamation claim had gone forward, Twist would have had to 
prove that McFarlane's readers understood the comic book to be a statement of 
fact, that the statements were false, and that they were made with knowledge 
or in reckless disregard of falsity. By misusing the right of publicity, Twist was 
able to obtain the same result without having to prove any of those elements. 
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Similarly, in Newcombe v. Adolph Coors CO. ,42 Don New­
combe, a former major league pitcher and recovering alco­
holic, sued when a drawing based on a photograph of him 
pitching in the 1949 World Series was used in a beer adver­
tisement.43 The complaint included claims for defamation, 
false-light privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional dis­
tress.44 The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for 
the defendants on the merits of those claims,45 but it permit­
ted the right of publicity claim to go forward,46 despite the 
lack of any evidence that the defendants were intentionally 
attempting to capitalize on Newcombe's fame.47 
Other cases are truly "stealth" defamation claims, in 
which the reputational interest of the celebrity is less obvi­
ous. Vanna White sued when an advertisement for Samsung 
Electronics poked fun at her by implying that she could be re­
placed by a robot.46 Major League Baseball players sued over 
parody baseball cards that made fun of their egos and other 
characteristics.49 Muhammad Ali sued when a drawing of 
him sitting naked in a boxing ring was published in Playgirl 
magazine.50 Johnny Carson sued the maker of a portable toi­
let called "Here's Johnny.,,51 None of these cases involved de­
famatory criticism of the celebrity; but in each case, the de­
fendant used the cultural associations denoted by the 
42. 157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998). 
43. Id at 689-90. 
44. Id. 
45. Id at 694-96. 
46. Id at 692-94. 
47. Id at 696 ("we cannot say that Cassidy copied the photograph with an 
intent to harm Newcombe. Furthermore, there is no evidence that anyone else 
associated with the production of the advertisement intended that it portray 
Newcombe, nor that they were aware that the drawing closely resembled New­
combe."). 
48. See White v. Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 
1992), reh'g den ied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (opinion of Kozinski, J., joined 
by O'Scannlain & Kleinfeld, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane). 
For commentary, see David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a 
Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 67 (1995). 
49. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n, 95 F.3d 
959 (10th Cir. 1996). 
50. See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. N.Y. 1978). 
51. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th 
Cir. 1983). Carson's claim strongly resembled a trademark dilution claim, be­
cause Carson used the phrase "Here's Johnny" as an unregistered trademark for 
restaurants and men's clothing. 
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celebrity to make a point-a sort of commercial commentary. 
In each case, what was really at stake was a dignity interest, 
rather than a strictly commercial interest;52 and in all but one 
of these cases, the celebrity was successfu1.53 
Why are courts as protective as they are of celebrity 
rights, even when it is fairly obvious that the impetus for the 
complaint is to control a perceived disparagement, rather 
than to stop a purely "commercial" exploitative use of the ce­
lebrity likeness? In Doe, for example, although the defen­
dants disclaimed any intent to comment on the hockey 
player,54 it is obvious that the defendants' intent was to draw 
a parallel between the "enforcers" in hockey and those in the 
Mafia. If the portrayal was defamatory, then New York 
Times should be in the forefront of the analysis, because the 
plaintiff was a public figure. If it was not defamatory, but 
merely disparaging, then shouldn't the First Amendment 
values guiding New York Times protect the right of the de­
fendant to criticize the plaintiff-even unfairly? 
The problem in Doe and similar cases is that courts have 
separated the "property" right that the celebrity claims in his 
or her image from the actual human being whose image is 
used. Courts too often view these cases as a misappropriation 
of a plaintiffs property right solely for commercial purposes, 
as if the "property" was a copyrighted work that was being 
duplicated for profit, rather than as a commentary about a 
person whose celebrity status is legitimately the subj ect of 
public scrutiny. In White, for example, the court dismissed 
the First Amendment argument almost out of hand, because 
Vanna White's "persona" had been used to help sell a prod­
uct.55 The reality is more complicated. The advertisement in 
52. For example, in a subsequent appeal involving Cardtoons' claims for tor­
tious interference with contractual relations and libel, the Tenth Circuit stated 
that "Cardtoons may well be correct in asserting that part of MLBPA's motiva­
tion in threatening legal action was to prevent the production of cards that they 
believed to be unflattering." Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players' 
Ass'n, 335 F.3d 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 2003). 
53. The exception is Cardtoons, in which the Tenth Circuit affirmed a judg­
ment for the creator of the parody baseball cards. Cardtoons was unsuccessful, 
however, in recovering damages from the players for tortious interference with 
Cardtoons' business. See Cardtoons, 335 F.3d at 1164-68. 
54. As the Missouri Supreme Court noted, this may have been an attempt to 
avoid a defamation claim. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
55. See White v. Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th 
Cir. 1992) ("The ad's spoof of Vanna White and Wheel of Fortune is subservient 
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question did not use a picture of Vanna White-it used a ro­
bot dressed in a wig and evening gown. 56 It was making fun 
of her, saying in effect that a robot could do her job. Isn't it 
likely that at least part of her motivation in bringing suit was 
to avenge this perceived slight? Similarly, in the Schwar­
zenegger case, isn't it obvious from the settlement that his 
motivation in bringing suit was to remove an unflattering 
caricature of him from the marketplacet7 
Certainly the makers of the Schwarzenegger bobblehead 
doll hoped to make a profit; but the idea behind the doll was 
also to make a comment about the actor-turned-politician.56 
Likewise, Samsung hoped to make a profit selling VCRs, but 
in doing so it took a part of our cultural landscape, poked fun 
at it, and used it as part of an advertisement. We ought to 
celebrate, or at least tolerate, such creativity; but instead we 
allow courts to punish such conduct because it is a "commer­
cial" use. All too often, as soon as something is characterized 
as a "commercial" use, the court forgets about other aspects of 
the use and brushes off First Amendment concerns. In cases 
like White, that is a serious error. To characterize that case 
simply as a commercial misappropriation is too facile. What 
courts need to recognize is that a celebrity image conjures up 
the celebrity (and all of his or her attendant personality traits 
and connotations) as a subject for legitimate comment; it is 
not just some separable, tangible creation of the celebrity. 
One may argue, as the Doe court held, that the Supreme 
Court recognizes differences between the right of publicity 
and defamation that make the former not subject to the same 
constitutional restrictions as the latter. But that argument, 
based on the Court's sole right of publicity case-Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.59-ignores the language 
and context of Zacchin i. As the majority repeatedly empha­
sized, Zacchini involved a claim that the broadcaster appro­
priated the plaintiff's "entire act" by broadcasting it on a news 
and only tangentially related to the ad's primary message: 'buy Samsung VCRs.' 
Defendants' parody arguments are better addressed to non-commercial paro­
dies. The difference between a 'parody' and a 'knock-off is the difference be­
tween fun and profit. "). 
56. Id. at 1396. 
57. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text. 
58. See Introduction and Statement of Facts, supra note 14, at 551 & n.34. 
59. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
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program.60 The majority explained its holding almost entirely 
in terms of economic harm: 
[T]he broadcast of petitioner's entire performance, unlike 
the unauthorized use of another's name for purposes of 
trade ... goes to the heart of petitioner's ability to earn a 
living as an entertainer. Thus, in this case, Ohio has rec­
ognized what may be the strongest case for a "right of pub­
licity" involving, not the appropriation of an entertainer's 
reputation to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial 
product, but the appropriation of the very activity by 
which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first 
I 61 p ace. 
It is true that the Court distinguished its defamation 
cases (notably New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan62 and Time, 
Inc. v. Hil?); but the Court's distinction was based on an un­
derstanding of the role of rights of publicity that does not fit 
the "commercial commentary" or "stealth defamation" cases. 
The Court in Zacchini described the state interests in provid­
ing different forms of protection to plaintiffs as follows: 
The interest protected in permitting recovery for placing 
the plaintiff in a false light is clearly that of reputation, 
with the same overtones of mental distress as in defama­
tion. By contrast, the State's interest in permitting a right 
of publicity is in protecting the proprietary interest of the 
individual in his act in part to encourage such entertain­
ment. . .. [This] interest is closely analogous to the goals 
of patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the 
individual to reap the reward of his endeavors and having 
little to do with protecting feelings or reputation. Second, 
the two torts differ in the degree to which they intrude on 
dissemination of information to the public. In [defamation 
and] false light cases the only way to protect the interests 
involved is to attempt to minimize publication of the dam­
aging matter, while in right of publicity cases the only 
60. Id. at 569 ("His complaint is that respondent filmed his entire act and 
displayed that film on television for the public to see and enjoy. This, he 
claimed, was an appropriation of his professional property."); see also id. at 575 
("[t]he First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when 
they broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent."); id. at 575 ("The 
broadcast of a film of petitioner's entire act poses a substantial threat to the 
economic value of that performance."). 
61. Id. at 576. 
62. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
63. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
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question is who gets to do the publishing.64 
Even if that accurately described Mr. Zacchini's situa­
tion, it surely is not an accurate description of the cases 
brought in lIVin ter or Doe, nor the case brought by Governor 
Schwarzenegger. In each of those cases, the principal pur­
pose of the suit was to enjoin and punish publication of 
speech that offended the plaintiff, rather than to vindicate 
primarily commercial interests. Even cases such as White, 
Carson, and Newcombe, while based on a "commercial" use of 
the individual's identity, cannot be said to have little to do 
with protecting feelings or reputation. The additional ele­
ment of critical commentary and/or dignity, whether denomi­
nated "commercial" or "expressive," makes these cases distin­
guishable from Zacchini and demands a higher level of 
scrutiny than the minimal levels often seen in these cases. 
III. WHY EXISTING FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARDS ARE 
FLAWED 
In the past fifteen years, courts have propounded various 
tests for ''balancing'' rights of publicity and the First Amend­
ment. Three principal tests have emerged, all of which pur­
port to allow sufficient breathing room for free expression 
while protecting celebrity rights. But even these relatively 
sophisticated analyses are flawed, because they allow celebri­
ties, politicians and other public figures to censor non­
defamatory speech without any corresponding public benefit. 
A .  The Rogers Standard 
In Rogers v. Grimaldi,65 the Second Circuit considered a 
claim by actress Ginger Rogers against the producers of a 
movie entitled Ginger and Fred66 The movie was not a docu­
mentary about the famous dancing partnership of Rogers and 
Fred Astaire; it was a fictional film about a pair of Italian' 
cabaret dancers who had acquired the nicknames "Ginger and 
Fred" because in their heyday they had imitated Rogers and 
Astaire.67 The Second Circuit held that "[i]n the context of al-
64. 433 U.S. at 573 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
65. 875 F.2d 994 (2nd Cir. 1989). 
66. GINGER AND FRED (MGMJUA 1986) (directed by Federico Fellini, star­
ring Giulietta Masina and Marcello Mastroianni). 
67. 875 F.2d at 996-97. 
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legedly misleading titles using a celebrity's name," neither 
the Lanham Act nor Oregon's right of publicity law was vio­
lated "unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underly­
ing work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, 
unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the con­
tent of the work.,,68 
The Rogers standard can be justified for titles of artistic 
works on the ground that the public has an interest in avoid­
ing consumer confusion that must be balanced against the 
public interest in free expression.69 It is well-settled that non­
defamatory books and movies about celebrities may be made 
without the celebrity's permission,70 so the mere presence of a 
celebrity's name in the title of a work does not by itself falsely 
suggest endorsement of that work by the celebrity.71 How­
ever, the presence of a celebrity's name in the title of a work 
probably does lead to a reasonable expectation that the work 
has something to do with the celebrity, so enforcing that ex­
pectation serves the government's interest in avoiding con-
d t· 72 sumer ecep IOn. 
68. Id at 999 (Lanham Act); see also id. at 1004 (finding no violation of the 
right of publicity "unless the title was wholly unrelated to the movie or was 
'simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or ser­
vices.'"). 
69. Id. at 999 (Lanham Act), 1004 (right of publicity). 
70. See, e.g., Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 862, 603 
P.3d 454, 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 353 (1979) (Bird, C.J. concurring) (concerning 
a fictionalized television biography of actor Rudolph Valentino); Hicks v. Casa­
blanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (concerning a fictionalized 
book and movie about mystery writer Agatha Christie); Taylor v. National 
Broadcasting Co., 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2433, 1994 WL 780690 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. 1994) (unpublished) (concerning a television biography of actress Elizabeth 
Taylor); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47, cmt. c (1995) 
("[TJhe right of publicity is not infringed by the dissemination of an unauthor­
ized print or broadcast biography. Use of another's identity in a novel, play or 
motion picture is also not ordinarily an infringement."); see also Tyne v. Time 
Warner Entm't Co., 901 So.2d 802 (Fla. 2005) (concerning a right of publicity 
claim on behalf of heirs of persons depicted in motion picture THE PERFECT 
STORM (Warner Bros. 2000); construing Florida statute narrowly to avoid First 
Amendment difficulties). 
71. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999-1000. The Court stated that "[iJn these circum­
stances, the slight risk that such use of a celebrity's name might implicitly sug­
gest endorsement or sponsorship to some people is outweighed by the danger of 
restricting artistic expression." Id. at 1000 (citing "the hit song 'Bette Davis 
Eyes' and the recent film 'Come Back to the Five and Dime, Jimmy Dean, 
Jimmy Dean.'"). 
72. See, e.g. , Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 451-58, 461 (6th Cir. 
2003) (concerning a suit by civil rights icon Rosa Parks against rap group that 
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The problem arises when the Rogers standard is applied 
not to the use of a celebrity's name in the title of an artistic 
work, but to the use of the celebrity's likeness in the work it­
self. For example, in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.,73 
the Sixth Circuit analyzed a claim that making and selling 
lithographs of a painting of Tiger Woods violated his right of 
publicity in part by asking whether "the presence of Woods' 
image in Rush's painting . . . [had] artistic relevance to the 
underlying work.'>74 In such a situation, the phrase "artistic 
relevance" is devoid of meaning. Relevance is a relational 
concept; it is used to describe the relationship between one 
thing and another.75 In the context of titles, "artistic rele­
vance" describes the relationship of the title to the underlying 
work. But asking whether part of a work has artistic rele­
vance to the work itself is nonsensical : the work is what it is, 
and removing any portion of it would create a different work. 
Such a test is also an invitation to censorship, as it invites the 
judge to choose a single "meaning" from among the myriad of 
possible meanings of an artistic work and to excise those por­
tions of the work which in his or her own view are not suffi­
ciently related to that meaning. 76 
B. The Saderup Standard 
In Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. ,77 the Califor-
used her name as the title of one of its songs; finding triable issue of fact as to 
whether her name had any artistic relevance to the song); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47, cmt. c (1995) ("However, if the name or 
likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not related to the 
identified person, the user may be subject to liability for the use of the other's 
identity in advertising."). 
73. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). For background on the case, see Tyler T. 
Ochoa, Introduction: Tiger Woods and the First Amendment, 22 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 381 (2000); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Amicus Curiae BriefofSeventy­
Three La w Professors in Support of Jireh Publishing, Inc., 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 
391 (2000). 
74. 332 F.3d at 937. 
75. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's notes ("Relevancy is 
not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but exists only as a rela­
tion between an item of evidence and a matter properly provable in the case. "). 
76. Modern artistic theory holds that a work of art does not have any objec­
tive meaning, but only whatever subjective meaning that it stimulates in the 
mind of the beholder; and that the subjective intention of the artist is neither 
possible to determine nor meaningful in assessing the artistic success of the 
work. See Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, The Juice and Fair Use: How the Grinch 
Silenced a Parody, 45 J. COPYRIGHT. SOC'y U.s. 546, 557 & nn.53-54 (1998). 
77. 25 Cal. 4th 387, 21 P.3d 797, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126 (2001). 
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nia Supreme Court was faced with a claim that reproductions 
of a charcoal drawing of the Three Stooges violated their post­
mortem right of publicity. The court first considered and re­
jected several proffered reasons why the First Amendment 
should not be deemed to protect the defendant's work. First, 
the court held that "although [Saderup's] work was done for 
financial gain, the First Amendment is not limited to those 
who publish without charge. An expressive activity does not 
lose its constitutional protection because it is undertaken for 
profit.,,7s Second, "[n]or do Saderup's creations lose their con­
stitutional protections because they are for purposes of enter­
taining rather than informing.,,79 Third, "[n]or does the fact 
that expression takes a form of nonverbal, visual representa­
tion remove it from the ambit of First Amendment protec­
tion. "so Fourth, "a work of art is protected by the First 
Amendment even if it conveys no discernable message . . . .',SI 
Fifth, "[n]or does the fact that Saderup's art appears in large 
part on a less conventional avenue of communications, T­
shirts, result in reduced First Amendment protection."s2 
Sixth, the court held that "a reproduction . . .  is entitled to as 
much First Amendment protection as an original work. of 
art.',S3 
Nonetheless, the court held that Saderup's lithographs 
and t-shirts were not protected by the First Amendment be­
cause of a countervailing government interest: 
[S]ociety may recognize . . that a celebrity's heirs and as­
signs have a legitimate protectible interest in exploiting 
the value to be obtained from merchandising the celeb­
rity's image, whether that interest be conceived as a kind 
of natural property right or as an incentive for encourag­
ing creative work. Although critics have questioned 
whether the right of publicity truly serves any social pur­
pose, there is no question that the Legislature has a ra­
tional basis for permitting celebrities and their heirs to 
78. Id at 396, 21 P.3d at 802, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 133 (internal brackets, 
quotes, and ellipses omitted). 
79. Id. at 398, 21 P.3d at 804, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 134. 
80. Id , 21 P.3d at 804, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 134. 
81. Id ; see Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) ("[aJ narrow, succinctly articulable mes­
sage is not a condition of constitutional protection"). 
82. 25 Cal. 4th at 399, 21 P.3d at 804, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 135. 
83. Id. at 408, 21 P.3d at 810, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142. 
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control the commercial exploitation of the celebrity's like-
84 ness. 
The fact that the Legislature may have a rational basis 
for protecting rights of publicity, however, does not explain 
why the state's interest should overcome the expressive inter­
est in a work of art such as that at issue in Saderup. In par­
ticular, the court made no attempt to explain why the tradi­
tional content-based tests of the First Amendment should not 
apply.85 In other contexts, of course, it is hornbook law that a 
court must subject a content-based speech restriction to strict 
scrutiny,86 meaning the law must be the least restrictive 
means necessary to accomplish a compelling government in­
terest.S7 Even content-neutral speech restrictions must meet 
intermediate scrutiny: the restriction must be narrowly tai­
lored to further a substantial government interest.88 Instead 
of applying one of these speech-protective tests, the court ig­
nored the First Amendment interest almost entirely and gave 
the right of publicity the deferential review applicable to or­
dinary economic regulation of conduct that does not have an 
expressive component. 
The standard the court adopted to "distinguish between 
forms of artistic expression protected by the First Amend­
ment and those that must give way to the right of publicity,,89 
was a "transformative use" test,90 borrowed from case law ap-
84. Id. at 400, 21 P.3d at 805, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 136 (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
85. When the right of publicity is used to preclude particular expression 
(e.g., a particular likeness of a celebrity), it should be deemed a "content-based" 
restriction. It is difficult to describe such a case as simply a content-neutral 
"time, place, and manner" restriction, unless the word "manner" is defined 
rather expansively. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 971 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Restrictions on the words or images 
that may be used by a speaker . . .  are quite different than restrictions on the 
time, place, or manner of speech.") (quoting Rogers, 875 F .2d at 999). 
86. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). 
87. See Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 455 (2002); Perry 
Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
88. Turner, 512 U.S. at 662. 
89. Comedy III Prods. , 25 Cal. 4th at 403, 21 P.3d at 807, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
at 139. 
90. !d. at 404-07, 21 P.3d at 807-10, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139-42 . The Court 
repeated the word "transformative" thirteen times in those three pages (and 
three more times in subsequently applying the test), both by itself and in such 
phrases as "transformative work," "significant transformative elements," and 
"transformative test." 
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plying the fair use doctrine in copyright law91: 
As the Supreme Court has stated, the central purpose of 
the inquiry . . .  is to see . . .  whether the new work merely 
supersedes the objects of the original creation, or instead 
adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, 
92 or message . . . .  
Elaborating on this standard, the court opined: 
When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depic­
tion or imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain . . .  the 
state law interest in protecting the fruits of artistic labor 
outweighs the expressive interests of the imitative artist. 93  
667 
The Saderup court's conclusion is flawed for at least two 
reasons. First, in uncritically adopting a standard from copy­
right law, the court ignored the fact that copyright has a spe­
cific Constitutional authorization,94 adopted only four years 
before the Bill of Rights, leading to the reasonable inference 
that the Framers must have believed copyright was consis­
tent with the First Amendment.95 The right of publicity, by 
contrast, has no such pedigree; rather, it was invented more 
than 160 years after the First Amendment was adopted,96 is 
91. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
92. Comedy III Prods. , 25 Cal. 4th at 404, 21 P.3d at 808, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
at 139 (internal quotes and brackets omitted). 
93. Id. at 405, 21 P.3d at 808, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140. 
94. See U.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power . . .  To 
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries."). For the historical background of the Clause, see Tyler T. Ochoa 
& Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 
49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'y U.s. 675 (2002). 
95. See generally L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An 
Essay Concerning the Founders' Wew of the Copyright Power Granted to Con­
gress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 
909 (2003). As numerous authors have pointed out, however, in 1791 copyright 
consisted only of a right to prohibit reproduction, and it is the broad right to 
prepare derivative works, added later, that creates serious First Amendment 
problems. See, e. g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Ima gination: Copyright's 
Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 48-59 (2002); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locat­
ing Copyright Within the First Amendm ent Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 38 
(2001); Lawrence Lessig, Coypright's First Amendment, 48 V.C.L.A. L. REV. 
1057, 1061-62 (2001). 
96. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 
866, 868 (2nd Cir. 1953). The right of publicity evolved from the right of pri­
vacy, which was first recognized approximately fifty years earlier. See Pavesich 
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). However, prior to 
Haelan Labs, the right of privacy was generally not deemed to outweigh the 
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not enshrined in the Constitution, and should not be deemed 
to have reduced the First Amendment's scope of protection.97 
Second, and more importantly, SaderuJis "transformative 
use" standard contradicts two of the First Amendment princi­
ples that the court had endorsed earlier in its opinion. The 
Saderup court stated that "a work of art is protected by the 
First Amendment even if it conveys no discernable mes­
sage,,,98 yet its standard expressly inquires whether the de­
fendant added "new expression, meaning, or message.,,99 The 
court also correctly stated that "[a]n expressive activity does 
not lose its constitutional protection because it is undertaken 
for profit,"IOO yet its standard expressly turns on whether the 
"artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or 
First Amendment in cases involving public figures. See O'Brien v. Pabst Sales 
Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941). Note that there was a preexisting exception 
for false endorsement cases in which the government's interest in preventing 
consumer deception was also implicated. See, e.g. , Edison v. Edison Polyform 
Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (N.J. Ch. 1907). 
97. While we may tolerate some limits on freedom of speech in order to en­
joy the speech-generating incentive provided by copyright law, the right of pub­
licity does not provide a similar public benefit, except in advertising cases in­
volving false endorsement. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973-76 (criticizing and 
limiting various rationales for the right of publicity); see also Michael Madow, 
Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 
CAL. L. REV. 127, 178-215 (1993). This is evidenced by the fact that countries 
such as the United Kingdom that lack a right of publicity have no shortage of 
celebrities. See Irvine v. Talksport, Ltd., 2 All E.R. 414 (Ch. 2002) (holding that 
an action for "passing off' is available in a false endorsement case, but not in a 
character merchandising case), atrd, 2 All E.R. 881 (C.A. 2003); cf. Cairns v. 
Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1023-24 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding there 
is no right of publicity in U.K.), atrd memo 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000), on ap­
peal after remand, 292 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of relief 
against sale of merchandise featuring likeness of Diana, Princess of Wales). 
Moreover, even if a state legislature were to decide otherwise, that judgment 
should not be free from the heightened scrutiny applied in other First Amend­
ment contexts. See supra discussion at notes 85-88 and accompanying text. 
98. Comedy III Prods. , 25 Cal. 4th at 399, 21 P.3d at 804, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
at 135. 
99. Id. at 404, 21 P.3d at 808, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139. While "expression" 
is not necessarily synonymous with "meaning or message," the court explained 
that "when we use the word 'expression,' we mean expression of something 
other than the likeness of the celebrity," id. at 406, 21 P.3d at 809, 106 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 141 and the examples the court gave of protected expression all in­
volved works with a discernable message. Id. ("We emphasize that the trans­
formative elements or creative contributions . . .  are not confined to parody and 
can take many forms, from factual reporting to fictionalized portrayal, from 
heavy-handed lampooning to subtle social criticism.") (citations omitted). 
100. Id at 396, 21 P.3d at 802, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 133 (internal brackets 
and quotes omitted). 
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imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain.,,101 
In a society that values freedom of speech, the govern­
ment has no business telling artists that they are forbidden to 
depict a public figure (and to sell such depictions to others) 
without that person's permission.102 While Saderup is more 
protective of speech than many previous cases, its self­
contradictory opinion relegates drawings, photographs, and 
sculptures of celebrities to the category of non-expressive 
commercial conduct, subject to regulation at the whim of the 
Legislature, instead of treating them as artistic speech pro­
tected against censorship by the First Amendment. 
C. The Doe Standard 
In Doe v. TCI Cablevision/03 (the "Tony Twist" case104), 
the Missouri Supreme Court reversed a trial court ruling in 
favor of the defendants. In doing so, the Court expressly re­
j ected both the "relatedness" test endorsed by the Restate­
mene05 (a test similar to the "artistic relevance" standard of 
Rogers106) and the "transformative use" test of Saderup,I07 be­
cause "they give too little consideration to the fact that many 
uses of a person's name and identity have both expressive and 
commercial components. ,,108 Instead, the court endorsed a 
"predominant use" test borrowed from a law review article109 
(written by a litigator who represents celebrities and celebrity 
101. Id. at 405, 21 P.3d at 808, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140 (emphasis added). 
102. The exception to this principle is advertising in which the unauthorized 
use of a celebrity image creates a likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship or 
endorsement by the celebrity. It is well-established that government may pro­
hibit false and misleading commercial speech without running afoul of the First 
Amendment. But a lithograph or a bobblehead doll is not commercial speech, 
which is defined as speech that "does no more than propose a commercial trans­
action." Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. , 255 F.3d 1 180, 1184 (9th Cir. 
2001) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 ( 1983» . 
Certainly no reasonable person would have believed that the Schwarzenegger 
bobblehead doll was sponsored or endorsed by the Governor. 
103. 1 10 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003). 
104. For the facts of the case, see supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text. 
105. See RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47, cmt. c ( 1995) 
("However, if the name or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work 
that is not related to the identified person, the user may be subject to liability 
for a use of the other's identity in advertising."). 
106. See discussion supra Part lILA. 
107. See discussion supra Part IILE. 
108. 110 S.W.3d at 374. 
109. Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right 
of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471 (2003). 
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estatesllO): 
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the 
commercial value of an individual's identity, that product 
should be held to violate the right of publicity and not be 
protected by the First Amendment, even if there is some 
"expressive" content in it that might qualify as "speech" in 
other circumstances. If, on the other hand, the predomi­
nant purpose of the product is to make an expressive 
comment on or about a celebrity, the expressive values 
could be given greater weight.lJl 
This test is even more flawed than the Saderup standard. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that whether speech is sold 
for profit is legally irrelevant to whether it receives protection 
under the First Amendment,112 yet Doe holds that a profit mo­
tive can disqualifY speech from First Amendment protec­
tion.1l3 Under this standard, a movie biography of a celebrity 
could be enjoined, because the "predominant" purpose of most 
movies is simply to make money for the movie studio. The 
Doe test also expressly permits a court to enjoin speech e ven 
jf it finds that the speech has expressive content. Virtually 
all published speech has both an expressive and a commercial 
component, so this test would in effect give a court carte 
blanche to censor speech at the behest of a celebrity, based 
solely on the court's personal view of the relative value of the 
speech. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Rights of publicity create difficult problems for freedom of 
expression. All too often, the use of a non-traditional medium 
of expression (in the First Amendment sense) and the exis­
tence of a "commercial" motive have caused many courts to 
lose sight of the core values at stake. As we have seen, the 
tests that courts have devised to account for the value of free 
110. See profile of Mark S. Lee, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, 
http://www.manatt.com/showresume.asp?id=1334 (last visited Mar. 16, 2005). 
Lee has represented management companies for, among others, Elvis Presley, 
John Wayne, Jimi Hendrix, Arnold Palmer, Gene Autry, and Diana, Princess of 
Wales. ld. 
111. 110 S.W.3d at 374 (quoting Lee, supra note 109, at 500). 
112. See e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952); 
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967). 
113. See 110 S.W.3d at 375 (requiring a jury instruction that defendant "in­
tended to obtain a commercial advantage" from the use of the plaintiffs name). 
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expression in right of publicity cases range from the some­
what protective, yet flawed (Saderup1l4), to the confusing 
( ETWs use of Rogers v. GrimaldiU5), to the excessively indul­
gent of a celebrity's assertion of the "commercial" motive of 
the expression ( Doe1l6 and White!l7). The defects in these tests 
have larger implications that resonate in the Schwarzenegger 
bobblehead case. First, they create uncertainty and inconsis­
tency about the ability to make unauthorized expressive uses 
of a celebrity's image or "persona."llB Second, the generally 
looser First Amendment scrutiny given to right of publicity 
claims has encouraged celebrities to attempt to censor uses of 
their images that the celebrities deem less than positive­
leading to the problem of "stealth defamation" claims. The 
combination of these two problems ultimately has a stultify­
ing effect on freedom of expression concerning a celebrity. 
One of the few unsuccessful stealth defamation, or com­
mercial commentary, cases is instructive here. CardtoonsJ 
L. C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n1l9 involved par­
ody baseball trading cards featuring caricatures of major 
league players and humorous, though often critical, commen­
taries on the caricatures on the reverse side of the cards. The 
players sued, alleging violations of their rights of publicity 
under Oklahoma law.1zo The district court dismissed the 
claim, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.121 In its opinion, the 
court of appeals wrote that: 
elevating the right of publicity above the right to free ex-
114. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 CaL 4th 387, 21 
P.3d 797, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126 (2001); discussion supra Part II.B. 
115. See 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); discussion supra Part II.A. 
116. See 110 S.W. 3d 363 (Mo. 2003); discussion supra Part II.B. 
117. See 971 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993); discussion supra pp. 658-59. 
118. This uncertainty is exacerbated by the choice of law problem for an ex­
pressive work that is being sold nationwide. While most courts now agree that 
the existence of a right of publicity is determined by the law of the plaintiffs 
domicile, see, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 
2002), it is far from clear that a single state's law should govern infringement of 
the right of publicity in every state. See Factors, Etc. Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 
F.2d 278, 281 (2nd Cir. 1981) (expressing doubt on this issue); Schumann v. 
Loew's, Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (discussing sixty-one causes 
of action, one for each state and several territories and foreign countries). 
119. 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996). 
120. The complaint also alleged a violation of the Lanham Act. The court 
easily dismissed that claim, finding no likelihood of confusion between the par­
ody cards and actual, authorized cards. Id at 966-67. 
121. Id. at 962. 
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pression would likely prevent distribution of the parody 
trading cards. This would not only allow [the Players' As­
sociation] to censor criticism of its members, but would 
also have a chilling effect upon future celebrity parodies. 
Such a result is clearly undesirable, for "the last thing we 
need, the last thing the First Amendment will tolerate, is 
a law that lets public figures keep people from mocking 
th ,,122 em. 
Surely this is what the Supreme Court had in mind in 
New York Times v. Sullivan when it said: 
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee 
the truth of all his factual assertions . . .  leads to . . .  'self 
censorship.' . . .  Under such a rule, would-be critics of offi­
cial conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism 
. . . .  The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the vari­
ety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.123 
The consequences of using a lax and inconsistent stan­
dard are at the heart of the Schwarzenegger bobblehead case. 
The most serious problem exposed by the Schwarzenegger 
lawsuit is that it was brought at all. Although Governor 
Schwarzenegger faced an uphill battle under California law/24 
the California Supreme Court has thus far only decided cases 
near the edges of its test-the fairly unembellished likeness 
in Saderup and the grotesque transformation in Ri'intel'-and 
the bobblehead fell somewhere in between. In Ri'inter, the 
California Supreme Court admonished lower courts to dis­
miss obvious cases at the pleading stage.125 However, as the 
bobblehead case demonstrates, where a celebrity has suffi­
cient resources, a colorable, if perhaps weak, lawsuit can still 
be filed, and a commercial commentator or detractor may be 
deterred from litigating (factoring in the inevitable expense of 
122. Id at 972-73, (quoting White v. Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 989 F.2d 
1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
bane» . 
123. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). 
124. A California state court would have applied the "transformative" test of 
Saderup and Winter. Under this test, the defendants would have had a strong 
argument that the gun and bandolier "transformed" the Governor's image from 
a straightforward celebrity image (such as that in Saderup) to a critical com­
mentary (such as that in Winter). But because the Saderup test is an interpre­
tation of the First Amendment , a federal district court would not be bound to 
apply Saderup, even to a case arising under California law. 
125. Winter, 30 Cal. 4th at 892, 69 P.3d at 480, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642. 
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an appeal, regardless of the outcome in the trial court). Thus, 
even the transformative use test does not send a sufficiently 
clear message that a celebrity cannot control unwanted com­
mentary. The settlement, which permitted the sale of the doll 
sans weapons, suppressed the very expression that led to the 
doll's creation.126 As the Supreme Court noted in another con­
text, it is not just the successful suit that can chill desirable 
activity; the threat of a suit can be equally effective, even if 
the suit would likely lose. 127 
The ultimate failure of the legal framework in the 
Schwarzenegger case is that the settlement "transformed" a 
piece of political satire (the original bobblehead doll) into 
something far more akin to an item of commerce by removing 
its most transformative expressive elements. A test designed 
to protect freedom of speech was instead used to subvert it. It 
should be apparent that a legal standard that effectively al­
lows a political figure to censor non-defamatory political 
speech is hardly an appropriate role for the First Amend­
ment. 
126. As noted in the Statement of Facts, the alleged creator of the doll did not 
participate in the settlement because of the elimination of the expression, and 
he is now using a different Schwarzenegger doll to criticize the Governor. In­
troduction and Statement of Facts, supra note 14, at 554. 
127. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 
(2000), in which the Supreme Court stated: "Competition is deterred, however, 
not merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit." The 
same could be said of speech. 
HeinOnline -- 45 Santa Clara L. Rev. 674 2004-2005
* * *  
